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Among groups challenging ACC policy during this decade, the New Zealand Business 
Roundtable offered the most passionate critique of the scheme and its founding assumptions.  The 
New Zealand Business Roundtable argued that the public interest was better served by promoting 
consumer choice in insurance coverage, delivered in a competitive market by private insurers.  This 
article explains the origins and rationale for this market-based critique, and provides a spirited 
statement of an economic philosophy that proved influential in shaping legislative reforms in the 
1990s. 
I PURPOSE 
I have been asked to comment on how and when the notion of competing private insurers for 
accident compensation emerged in the New Zealand debate in the 1980s and 1990s. 
I am an economist with a career in public policy and finance.  I am not a historian.  It is easier 
for me to explain the economics of the case for competing insurers than to suggest why the debate 
did not emerge until the 1980s and 1990s.  Yet the contribution of economic analysis to the public 
debate was sadly neglected until the New Zealand Business Roundtable was formed and started 
commissioning diverse economic experts to research the issue.  It has stuck to this task over the 
years and is surely by now the most substantial contributor to informed public debate on the matter. 
The economic analysis is of enduring relevance to the question as to what issues must be 
addressed if New Zealand is not to spend another 25 years futilely tinkering with a system that lacks 
a coherent basis and endlessly shifts priorities because there is no sound basis for trading them off.  
To that extent the paper is forward-looking. 
  
*  Principal, Capital Economics. 
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For the history the paper relies heavily on source material, most particularly the detailed study 
published by Geoffrey Palmer (now Sir Geoffrey) in 1979.1  It also uses the brief but more 
accessible New Zealand Employers Federation review in September 1995.2 
From a public policy perspective the history is relevant to any study into the underlying causes 
of the numerous major policy failures in New Zealand during the last 50 years.3  If New Zealanders 
want a prosperous future the first step is to stop repeating past mistakes.   
II THE ACC'S VERSION OF WHY AND WHEN 
There is a succinct history of New Zealand's current accident compensation scheme (ACS) on 
the Accident Compensation Corporation's website.  It first mentions the notion of competing 
insurers in the context of the terms of reference given in December 1990 to the Working Party on 
the Accident Compensation Corporation and Incapacity.  It is probably no coincidence that this 
working party was commissioned by a new incoming government and convened by an economist − 
Bernard Galvin, a former Secretary to the Treasury.   
Prior to this development, the policy focus had been on making the scheme more ambitious 
under the direction of Sir Geoffrey Palmer.  Sir Geoffrey played a major part in the 1969 White 
Paper, and was deputy prime minister in the government that received the 1986 Officials Committee 
report and the 1987 and 1988 Law Commission reports when the Rt Hon Sir Owen Woodhouse 
presided over the Commission.  The 1988 report recommended inter alia that entitlements should 
be extended to illness as soon as possible. 
  
1  Geoffrey Palmer, Compensation for Incapacity: A Study of Law and Social Change in New Zealand and 
Australia (Oxford University Press, Wellington, 1979). 
2  New Zealand Employers Federation A New Prescription for Accident Compensation (New Zealand 
Employers Federation, Wellington, 1995) 1-69. 
3  The imposition of import licensing as a 'temporary' measure in response to the 1938 foreign exchange crisis 
formed the basis of the protectionist strategies of the next 40 years, while more successful countries adopted 
outward-looking strategies.  Agricultural subsidies saw meat rendered into tallow.  Energy policy failures 
led to the 'Think Big' projects.  Lack of fiscal and monetary discipline in the 1970s and early 1980s saw 
major increases in effective tax rates without explicit parliamentary approval through fiscal drag, and the 
deferred tax increases implicit in deficit spending.  The same short-termism saw new welfare programmes of 
potentially crippling proportions, notably the domestic purposes benefit and the 1975 national 
superannuation scheme.  These were introduced without due regard for their future implications for tax 
rates, adult welfare dependency or child poverty and deprivation.  The short-termism also led to the 
debilitating price, wage and interest rate freeze of 1982-1984 and the debt spiral that caused the 1984 
foreign exchange crisis.  The unnerving rise in welfare dependency during the last 25 years also arguably 
owes much to product and labour market regulations that destroy jobs, relatively high benefit levels and − as 
the United States success in reducing it is demonstrating − an undisciplined approach to eligibility 
conditions.  The planned ratification of the Kyoto Protocol smacks of more short-termism and policy failure. 
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The ACC's history states that the terms of reference for the Galvin report suggested that one 
way to reduce the cost of the scheme to society would be to provide greater freedom of choice 
between insurers and create competition between the public and private sectors.  It attributed the 
pressure for change to "demands" by the Employers Federation and the Business Roundtable that 
employers stop paying for employees' non-work accidents and that the overall cost of the scheme be 
reduced. 
III THE CONSUMER WELFARE RATIONALE FOR COMPETITION 
Any unbiased reading of the Business Roundtable's submissions during this period would 
establish that its concerns were far broader right from the start.  Its first foray into this area was a 
submission prepared in July 1987 with the assistance of an academic economist from Monash 
University, Ian McEwin.  This submission did not propose, let alone demand, either of the goals 
mentioned.  Instead it proposed a reduced role for government through user empowerment.  The 
concluding recommendation in its executive summary was: 4 
By encouraging the competitive supply of innovative accident insurance, returning the accident 
insurance decision back to the consumer, and encouraging safety through the competitive insurance and 
liability system, overall community welfare would be improved. 
Its follow-up submission in December 1987 stressed the lack of a sound analytical framework 
for the Law Commission's findings and their lack of economic sophistication.  Again it emphasised 
the need for a principled re-evaluation of the whole approach:5 
The appropriate starting point is a reevaluation, based on the best modern scholarship, of the proper 
government role (or community responsibility) in promoting more efficient insurance and safety 
arrangements to reduce accidents, foster rehabilitation and provide the desired level of income 
replacement.  There is a wealth of literature and analysis available on this topic … which the Law 
Commission does not appear to have examined and utilised. 
Submissions to the Law Commission from organisations with strong professional economic expertise 
have laid out a basic framework and broad conclusions supporting those presented in the Business 
Roundtable's [July 1987] study.  It is submitted that the Law Commission should be guided by this 
analysis, and apply its expertise to the development of legal and institutional arrangements that will 
support an approach to accident disability based on appropriate legal incentives to encourage safety, the 
competitive provision of private insurance, consumer choice as to disability insurance and a role for the 
state in ensuring minimum cover and the means to acquire it. 
  
4  New Zealand Business Roundtable Review of Accident Compensation: A Submission to the Law 
Commission (submission to Law Commission, New Zealand Business Roundtable, 1987) ii. 
5  Review of Accident Compensation, above. 
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Between 1988 and 1990 the Business Roundtable commissioned further reports and submissions 
from an impressive number of independent academic economists.  In 1990 alone it commissioned 
independent reports from Patricia Danzon, Michael Porter, and my employer at the time, Jarden 
Morgan.  All these reports stressed the importance of incentives and competition for community 
welfare.6 
Where did these economic notions come from?  A clearly articulated rationale for the 
desirability of competition has been with us for centuries.  Adam Smith most famously explained 
the virtues of competition and free trade more than two centuries ago.  If competition is a virtue its 
antithesis − monopoly − is harmful by association.  Indeed, economic theory has provided the 
analytical basis for anti-monopoly policies in the United States and in the Commerce Act 1986 in 
New Zealand.7 
Economists recognise that market forces will generally overcome a private monopoly in time 
through competition (and the elapse of patent rights).  However natural and statutory monopolies 
are special cases that cannot be overcome by competition, essentially by definition.  The degree to 
which natural monopolies are a problem is a controversial issue, but it is not relevant here. 
Economists last century widely thought that statutory monopoly would be benign because 
governments were benevolent.  This theory of regulation is known as the public interest theory or 
normative analysis as a positive theory.  It assumes that governments actually behave in the public 
interest − that is, as an impartial spectator would wish them to behave.  However, this theory has 
lacked supporters for several decades.  There are two reasons for this: (1) no one has been able to 
provide an analysis that explains how the public could induce legislators and regulators to act in 
accordance with this theory and (2) a large amount of evidence refutes it.8 
Everyday experiences with State monopolies illustrate the complexity of the political and 
bureaucratic environments in which they operate.  The lack of competition exposes them to severe 
conflicts of interest.  Often they empower those who control them at the expense of their customers 
and taxpayers.  Politicians find they have far less power than many imagine.  For example, state 
schools and hospitals, or a fire service, might be effectively controlled by unions and professional 
groups that may produce mediocrity rather than strive for performance.  The great frustration that 
results for customers and the best professionals is easy to observe in our schools, universities and 
hospitals. 
  
6  Geoffrey Palmer Compensation for Incapacity: A Study of Law and Social Change in New Zealand and 
Australia (Oxford University Press, Wellington, 1979) 200, acknowledges the failure of the Woodhouse 
report to engage in economic analysis. 
7  For a brief history of economic regulation, see W Kip Viscusi, John M Vernon, and Joseph E Harrington Jr, 
Economics of Regulation and Antitrust (2 ed, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass), 1995) 311-317. 
8  Viscusi, above, 326. 
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Most commonly, State monopolies cannot be managed purposefully and cannot be held to 
account.  This is because they lack a single overriding objective.  Consider, for example, a decision 
that would increase output but reduce quality.  If the State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) has the goal of 
increasing output and quality (for a given cost) the decision is arbitrary.  Purposeful management is 
impossible. 
The statutory monopoly that is the Accident Compensation Corporation has a host of conflicting 
objectives.  "Key" objectives encompass safety, rehabilitation and insurance.  In every direction 
there are trade-offs between quantity and quality, speed and care.  The history of the ACC is in 
good part a story of changing, politically driven priorities.  Politicians (and the ACC itself) lack the 
information and incentives necessary to determine the actual priorities of the public when it comes 
to trading off choice, quality, quantity and cost.  When consumers are disempowered, changes in 
priorities probably reflect changes in interest group pressures. 
The (SOE) model attempted to rectify this problem in other cases by imposing a single, 
overriding objective − the profit motive.  However, the incentives to monitor SOEs in the interests 
of taxpayers or consumers are limited and management is not constrained by an active takeover 
market.9  In any case, the SOE model is unstable.  Sooner or later politicians will (re)introduce 
conflicting multiple objectives for political purposes that may not be laudable.  
The benefits of competition are difficult to secure when even one competitor is state-owned.  
State ownership creates a conflict of interest for governments.  Its very existence can inhibit 
competition and price discovery.  State ownership presents other problems for governments.  For 
example, they do not know the SOE's cost of capital or how to best mimic market disciplines for 
under-performing management teams.  For many years there was a debate in the empirical literature 
as to how much state ownership mattered for economic efficiency.  This is more an issue of the 
vitality of the competitive process than the survival of the privatised firm.  Privatisation is usually 
associated with deregulation in order to secure the gains from competition.  To survive, the 
privatised firm will usually have to improve its performance markedly, but doing so will not 
guarantee its survival.  As the recent near-demise of Air New Zealand demonstrated, this is not the 
way State-owned media, or many other journalists, will portray business failure.  In the popular 
view, and alas in the view of some academic economists, business failure is a story of private sector 
failure and management incompetence rather than an inevitable product of the market's verdict on 
the relative merits of competing products or strategies. 
Moreover, since competition is the key to consumer welfare, it is not clear that a heavily 
regulated privatised industry will perform much better than a state-owned industry.  Much depends 
on the quality of regulation.  Intensive regulation inevitably creates artificial distinctions between 
the regulated firms and the rest.  These become entry barriers that impede competition. 
  
9  See Treasury Economic Management (Government Printer, Wellington, 1984) 293. 
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The benefits of competition are often not readily measurable.  It is a common (self-serving) 
fallacy amongst antitrust regulators to point to lower prices as a benefit of 'introduced' competition.  
However, lower prices are not inherently desirable.  Lower prices may herald lower quality and 
future supply problems, as in the Californian electricity crisis.  One virtue of competition is that it 
should lead prices to track costs, where costs are subjective and forward-looking.  Another virtue is 
that competition allows choice between quality and variety, and usually eliminates queues.  
Regulation (and monopoly) commonly takes on a 'one-size-fits-all' character.  People resent its 
arbitrariness and lack of choice.  Competition empowers the common consumer − and thereby civil 
society.  This benefit is not readily measurable either, but that does not mean that 'reformers' should 
ignore it. 
While economists have usually agreed about the benefits of competition, there has been more 
debate about the issue of government ownership.  This was in part because of the problems of 
disentangling the issues of monopoly, ownership more generally, and regulation.  However, by the 
early 1990s a strong consensus was developing that ownership matters for consumer welfare, with 
the World Bank to the fore in making the case in favour of private ownership.10  That consensus has 
consolidated in the economic literature in the intervening years.11  Moreover, it now accords with 
world-wide practice. 
IV WHY WAS COMPETITION FROM PRIVATE INSURERS NOT AN ISSUE 
EARLIER? 
Geoffrey Palmer has provided an interest group analysis of how the private insurers lost their 
battle in 1971-72 to preserve a role for themselves, notwithstanding the presence of a National 
government at the time.12 
The impetus for the Woodhouse reforms came from a small group (notably lawyers), not public 
demand.13  The reformers desired to replace a private insurance and liability regime by a social 
insurance regime – essentially for reasons of collectivist ideology and expediency.  Socialism and 
confidence in the beneficence and competence of big government were at their height in the 1970s.  
The principles espoused in the Woodhouse report were based on collectivist values.  In Geoffrey 
  
10  For a review, see New Zealand Business Roundtable The Public Benefit of Private Ownership − The Case 
for Privatisation (New Zealand Business Roundtable, 1992). 
11  See, for example, William Megginson and Jeffrey Netter "From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical 
Studies on Privatization" [2001] Journal of Economic Literature 321. 
12  Geoffrey Palmer, Compensation for Incapacity: A Study of Law and Social Change in New Zealand and 
Australia (Oxford University Press, Wellington, 1979) 115-123.  He reports a senior Government Minister 
as commenting that the fire and accident companies failed to contribute to National Party funds and also 
suggests that they earlier adopted a too accommodating strategy. 
13  Palmer, above, 66-67, 69 and 83-84. 
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Palmer's sympathetic assessment they were: "… a deliberate attempt to provide a reformulation of 
social aims on which a new sort of welfare state could be built".14  In so doing they "assume[d] the 
legitimacy of a large area for government action, the justification for which was never argued".15 
Social insurance precludes the actuarially fair premiums that drive competitive (unregulated) 
insurance markets.  Actuarially fair premiums provide individuals with an incentive to reduce their 
premiums by taking more care or providing more self-insurance.  Healthier lifestyles and a better 
balancing of risk and reward should result. Flat premiums are a subsidy for risky activities and 
irresponsible behaviour.  This can affront public opinion and undermine civil society. 
These effects worry those who take incentives seriously.  They may not worry those who take 
an optimistic view of human nature.  Geoffrey Palmer no doubt rightly stressed the noble aspect of 
the collectivists' vision:16 
The vision … was warm-hearted and humane.  It took an optimistic view of human nature.  The basic 
idea was that those in distress should be helped, that the well-being of each was a concern for all.  
Whether the vision and the efforts made to implement it represent significant social progress I leave it to 
others to observe. 
Nothing in this paper should be read as a challenge to the sincerity of the sentiments that 
underlay the 1967 Woodhouse report and its aftermath.  However, public policies must be grounded 
in a sound appreciation of the flaws in human nature and the problems of information and 
incentives that commonly confound government action.  Incentives do matter.  One incentive is to 
exploit the power of the state.  That power is readily abused and the natural tendency is for 
government to grow and liberty to retreat, as Thomas Jefferson famously observed.  Another 
incentive is to take less care when the costs fall on others.  Systems of social insurance are intended 
to delink costs and rewards.17 
For example, a private accident insurance scheme would tend to only insure against accidents 
that have yet to occur or harms that have yet to be revealed.  Those making false declarations 
concerning their pre-existing health status would not have a right to the premiums paid by others.  
In contrast, social insurance may pay out on harms that may not exist arising from long past events 
  
14  Palmer, above, 56. 
15  Palmer, above, 205.  Palmer also describes at 93 how the 1969 Gair Committee avoided the question of the 
relationship between ACC and the welfare system. 
16  Palmer, above, 407. 
17  Richard Epstein sums up the differences between private and social insurance in Richard Epstein Accident 
Compensation: The Faulty Basis of No-fault and State Provision (New Zealand Business Roundtable, 1996) 
38-39. 
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that may or may not have occurred − and if they did were deliberate crimes, not accidents.18  But 
the most important benefit is that a private insurance system would not compel any person to 
contribute to a policy that was so open to abuse.  Choice and variety would prevail. 
The Woodhouse proposals were consistent with social insurance in that they proposed flat 
premiums that did not respond to risk differentials, but they were inconsistent in not proposing 
social insurance for loss of earnings from accidents and sickness.  The inconsistency was 
presumably expedient − a halfway house was better than nothing. 
In the event, the social insurance aspect was further undermined when the scheme that was 
implemented provided for industry risk rating in the assessment of premiums.  The ACS is not the 
Woodhouse scheme, but Woodhouse is its father. 
Sir Geoffrey Palmer acknowledged one of these inconsistencies in proposing legislation to 
extend coverage to sickness in the second half of the 1980s.  However, this ambitious task was 
thwarted by the change of government following the 1990 general election. 
Given the endless difficulties with the ACS, it was only a matter of time before the need was 
felt to clarify its conceptual basis.  Was it part of the welfare state or was it a system of insurance?  
The debate on this issue in 1991 was the first to occur in front of those competent to assess 
economic arguments, and the Galvin report found in favour of the insurance model and competitive 
private insurance.  This recommendation was not picked up until 1998 when competition was 
introduced for the employers' account. 
The current Government's decision to return to a State monopoly appears to have been entirely 
political and at odds with professional advice.  It solves none of the problems that arise from 
statutory monopoly and persuades no new constituency of its merits.  It can have no stability. 
V WHAT ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE RIGHT TO SUE? 
The Woodhouse report was also expedient in its drive to abolish the right to sue.  Sir Geoffrey 
Palmer summed up the rationale for abolition as follows:19 
Strategically it was essential to the Woodhouse style of reform that a compelling case be developed 
against the common law. If the common law survived, a comprehensive system for injury was 
unattainable. If the common law remained, the financial logic of the reform was destroyed – new sources 
of revenue would be needed rather than making better use of the existing money. 
  
18  See, for example, the opinions reportedly expressed by Dr Felicity Goodyear-Smith in Leah Haines "Sex 
Abuse: 47,000 get Compo of $100m" (14 March 2001) The Dominion Wellington.  
19  Palmer, above, 25. 
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The argument at the time was that the money spent on litigation could be better spent on helping 
the victim.  Viewed from an insurance perspective, lawyers siphon off too much of any award from 
a successful action under a tort system. 
This political argument successfully confused an insurance system with a liability system.  A 
tort liability system is concerned with determining cause or blame and penalising the same.  Its 
economic value lies in the salutary signal it gives to onlookers and the incentives it thereby 
generates to avoid future accidents.20  It also accords with a deep desire for justice – those who 
cause injury to others through irresponsible behaviour are held to account and confronted with the 
costs if found to be at fault.  In contrast, an insurance system is concerned to provide relief to the 
victim regardless of fault.  The two systems form an harmonious whole; they are complementary.  
Woodhouse's 'success' was to present them as substitutes. 
The rationale for denying common law remedies for personal injuries may have been more 
defensible if they were having irredeemably perverse effects.  However, at least one of the scheme's 
proponents freely acknowledges that this was not the case: 21 
While the right to sue existed in New Zealand, it was not availed of nearly with the same vigour or with 
the same determination that it has been in the United States. Contingent fees, of course, were unlawful in 
New Zealand. There were a number of actors which tended to make this a moderate system. The judges 
controlled it. Even though the juries made the findings of liability and the awards of damages, the judges 
controlled it much more than is possible in the United States because they were allowed to comment on 
the evidence. When judges comment on the evidence in New Zealand, the juries tend to take notice of 
them. 
You cannot find, therefore, in the legal system of New Zealand or in the jurisprudence relating to the tort 
system anything that has any explanatory power in relation to the accident compensation scheme. There 
was little in the way of abuse or excess. It was a most mild-mannered little tort system. 
Unprincipled arguments produce stable policies only by chance.  Although in 1979 the right to 
sue might have looked well dead and buried, subsequent developments point to a different 
conclusion.  In recent years, judges appear to have restored a system of liability through judicial 
activism in the form of awarding exemplary damages in favour of the victims of accidents.22  
Furthermore, the abolition of lump-sum payments in 1992 and their replacement by an 
independence allowance appear to have reduced trade union support for retaining the abolition.  It is 
  
20  For a dialogue involving Richard Epstein and Geoffrey Palmer on the deterrence effects of tort processes in 
relation to empirical work by Michael Trebilcock and others, see Epstein, above, 20-21 and 39-41. 
21  Sir Geoffrey Palmer "The New Zealand Experience" (1993) 15 University of Hawaii L Rev 612. 
22  The paper to this conference by Ailsa Duffy "The Common Law Response to the Accident Compensation 
Scheme" (2003) 34 VUWLR, 367 outlines this evolving response and concludes that the pressures to revive 
the right to sue will grow. 
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also interesting to note that the greatest opposition to the original proposal to abolish the right to sue 
came from the insurers.23  Presumably, the return to a system of competing insurers will add to this 
constituency. 
The issue of the return to the right to sue was addressed in considerable detail by the author with 
the assistance of Richard Epstein and other lawyers in a chapter of a report by Credit Suisse First 
Boston for the Business Roundtable in November 1998.24  The only factors that stopped a clean 
favourable recommendation were the concerns about judicial activism and the absence of guidelines 
for behaviour and cost awards, particularly during any transitional phase.  The concerns focused on 
the need for sanctity of contract in relation to assignments of risk and the need to guard against 
capricious and excessive awards.  These concerns are capable of being addressed. 
VI LESSONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 
In its 1995 annual report the Law Commission identified six recurring sources of poor quality 
regulation.  The following convenient summary is taken from a recent Business Roundtable 
publication:25 
First, inadequate problem definition.  Framing the problem too narrowly or too broadly, or wrongly 
identifying it, results in policies and legislation which are inappropriate and ineffective. 
Secondly, an assumption that legislation is needed when it may not be.  This may be the result of 
inadequate and delayed legal advice. 
Thirdly, a failure of the legislation to give effect to the intended policy.  This is often a reflection of the 
first problem and the next. 
Fourthly, premature introduction of legislation.  This is a growing problem in the Commission's view.  It 
leaves large and complex issues to be grappled with by select committees.  Resolving those issues takes 
time and resources which are more profitably used at the drafting and policy development stages. Under-
prepared legislation also compromises the public submissions process, especially when the need for 
further development is acknowledged at the time of its introduction. 
Fifthly, a failure to comply with accepted constitutional principle.  One example is the use of open-
textured drafting. This could be a legitimate choice (for example, to leave the development of the law in 
  
23  Geoffrey Palmer, Compensation for Incapacity: A Study of Law and Social Change in New Zealand and 
Australia (Oxford University Press,  Wellington, 1979) 67. 
24  New Zealand Business Roundtable Accident Compensation: Options for Reform (New Zealand Business 
Roundtable, 1998) chapter 6. 
25  New Zealand Business Roundtable Constraining Government Regulation (New Zealand Business 
Roundtable, 2001) 39. 
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certain areas to the courts), but there must as well be proper and comprehensive policy development 
before the legislation is introduced. 
Sixthly, a failure to draft law which is as understandable and accessible as possible.  Improvements can 
be observed, but much legislation could be written more plainly, with major advantages to those affected 
by it.26 
A Inadequate Problem Definition 
Sir Geoffrey Palmer's study of the policy processes makes it clear that there was little public 
demand for change: 
• "a balanced assessment" of the pressures for change "would not have concluded that much 
change was needed";27 
• the assessment of the virtues and deficiency of the common law in the Woodhouse report 
was one-sided, neglecting in particular issues of justice, pain and suffering and intangible 
loss;28 and 
• in contrast, "everyone agreed" that the regulated benefits for workers' compensation, which 
had not been reviewed since 1956, needed to be "substantially upgraded and that the need 
to do so was urgent".  Palmer expresses the view that it is possible that "anything 
resembling a full Woodhouse scheme" would not have come to pass if this upgrade had 
occurred.29 
B An Assumption that Legislation is Needed When it May Not Be 
It is clear that the contemplated legislation was not needed in order to address the problem that 
benefit levels were undesirably low because of the failure to review an existing regulatory 
imposition.  The legislation was only necessary for the pursuit of an ideological goal.30 
C Premature Introduction of Legislation 
Palmer comments that the original New Zealand Bill would not have passed the scrutiny of the 
Australian Senate Standing Committee for Legal and Constitutional Affairs.  In his assessment the 
New Zealand Bill was primitive compared to the Australian Bill:  "The deliberate approach in New 
  
26  New Zealand Law Commission Annual Report 1995 (Report 33, Wellington, 1995) 14–15. 
27  Geoffrey Palmer, Compensation for Incapacity: A Study of Law and Social Change in New Zealand and 
Australia (Oxford University Press,  Wellington, 1979)  69. 
28  Palmer, above, 31. 
29  Palmer, above, 88. 
30  Peter McKenzie's address to this conference: Peter McKenzie "The Compensation Scheme No-One Asked 
for: The Origins of ACC in New Zealand" (2003) 34 VUWLR 193 illustrates the point. 
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Zealand was to pass the Bill and start the scheme working.  Amendments were to be made in the 
light of experience".31 
D A Failure of the Legislation to give Effect to the Intended Policy 
The actual legislation was a compromise between social insurance concepts and private 
insurance that (inevitably) lacked a coherent basis.  F A Hayek has observed that the process of 
decision making by factions and majority rule can be expected to produce outcomes that a majority 
would oppose.32 
What we call the will of the majority is thus really an artifact of the existing institutions, and particularly 
of the omnipotence of the sovereign legislature, which by the mechanics of the political process will be 
driven to do things that most of its members do not really want, simply because there are no formal 
limits to its powers. 
The payout of over $100 million to 47,000 people for sexual abuse claims, particularly in the 
absence of adequate validation in all too many cases, surely demonstrates such a situation.33 
E A Failure to Comply with Accepted Constitutional Principle 
The overriding by statute of the common law is a serious matter in relation to constitutional 
government and the preservation of liberty and democracy.  Respect for common law rights is a 
bulwark against despotic government.34 
Palmer acknowledges the significance of the decision in New Zealand to end the right to sue in 
relation to personal injury from accidents.  His study highlights how much weaker the constitutional 
constraints were in New Zealand at the time than in Australia: 
• in New Zealand the collectivist vision of community responsibility in the Woodhouse 
report was "never attacked".  Yet if it was accepted, much had to be conceded.  In 
  
31  Palmer, above, 203. 
32 Fredrich A Hayek "Economic Freedom and Representative Government" in Basil Blackwell Economic 
Freedom (Institute of Economic Affairs, Oxford, 1991) 385–386. 
33  New Zealand Business Roundtable Constraining Government Regulation (New Zealand Business 
Roundtable, 2001) 42. 
34  Constraining Government Regulation, above, cites Bruno Leoni as positing that legislation in matters of 
private law is fundamentally incompatible with political freedom and is not really compatible with free 
markets (see Constraining Government Regulation, above, 81).  It proposes that regulatory proposals be 
explicitly tested for the degree to which they preserve venerable common law causes for action against harm 
(see Constraining Government Regulation, above, 212). 
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Australia the same idea was attacked in parliamentary debate as "the death of 
individualism";35 
• in Australia, the Prime Minister had to obtain formal constitutional advice.  The power of 
the federal government to bar proceedings for damages that were a right under State law 
was in question and only a decision by the High Court in Australia was authoritative;36 
• in Australia, the constitutional argument in relation to the proposed blocking off of the 
common law ability to sue on behalf of injured children "was decisive";37 and 
• in Australia, the opposition could thwart a determined Prime Minister because the 
government at the time did not have a majority in the Senate.38 
Since this address is to a legal audience I will not bore it with more than a few brief remarks 
about how an institutional economist might evaluate the ACS.  An economic analysis starts with 
exactly the same question as a legal analysis − what problems are people actually experiencing that 
the government intervention is intended to address?  The analysis should move from symptoms to 
causes.  If government action is still to be contemplated, its objective should be determined in the 
light of those causes.  Proposed interventions should be evaluated against that objective.  The 
evaluation would take into account such matters as the quality of the incentives the intervention 
would put in place and the degree to which it made it more or less costly for people to transact.  For 
example, if the problem were that benefit levels were perceived to be too low, the problem 
definition phase might ask what was stopping those who wanted higher benefit levels from funding 
them.  
It is almost inconceivable that any competent economic analysis could have identified actual 
harms to the common person with existing arrangements for which the solution was a state 
monopoly insurer and the abolition of the right to sue.   
In contrast to a practical approach to problem definition, the Woodhouse report conceived the 
problem to be that the world was not how the reformers would like to see it.  They dreamed of a 
world in which everyone was collectively responsible for everyone's actions but their own.  In their 
world incentives did not matter because they had "an optimistic view of human nature".  In contrast, 
the common law freedoms of choice and contract and the system of tort remedies that the 
government overturned so lightly was a product of over a thousand years of testing against actual 
  
35  Geoffrey Palmer Compensation for Incapacity: A Study of Law and Social Change in New Zealand and 
Australia (Oxford University Press, Wellington, 1979) 205. 
36  Palmer, above, 279-283. 
37  Palmer, above, 209. 
38  Palmer, above, 209. 
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human nature. Its evolutionary path is undoubtedly flawed but this is not a case for its displacement 
by flawed political decision making.  We have yet to escape the folly of utopian thinking and the 
hubris of the anointed.39 
VII CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Some might argue that the survival of the ACS for over a quarter of a century demonstrates that 
it is here to stay.  However, much greater follies lasted longer − import licensing, communism, the 
Berlin Wall and apartheid.  The longevity of the ACS is trivial in comparison to that of the common 
law regime it so cavalierly displaced. 
There appears to be no principled defence of a state monopoly insurer.  The benefits from the 
introduction of competition were dramatic and it is only a matter of time before ideology must bow 
to reason.40  Nor is there any detectable stability in the debate going back to 1969 between the 
social insurance model and the private insurance model.  The evolving rorts and inequities of the 
social insurance approach will continue to affront public opinion when they are drawn to its 
attention. 
The stability of the abolition of the right to sue must also be in question.  It is plausible that 
there is a deep need for justice to be done in cases of serious negligence − witness the public's 
response to the Erebus and Cave Creek disasters.  
A greater constitutional respect for the preservation of common law rights in New Zealand 
might have prevented the unprincipled and opportunistic abolition of the right to sue that was 
critical to the success of the Woodhouse scheme.  It is ironical that the charge to abolish it was led 
by (some) lawyers.  Perhaps in 20 years' time the verdict will be that this was yet another folly 
associated with the New Zealand dream to 'lead the world' in social reform. 
The advent of competing insurers and the restoration of the right to sue would not end the 
debate about the proper role of the state in relation to workers' compensation.  The history of state 
intervention in workers' compensation is about a century old.  It predates the enthusiasms that led to 
the Woodhouse proposals. 
Prior to 1900, workers in New Zealand relied on the common law for compensatory redress.  
Legislative changes in Britain in 1897 and a major mining accident in New Zealand in 1896 led to 
  
39  The reference is to Thomas Sowell The Vision of the Anointed: Self-Congratulation as a Basis for Social 
Policy (BasicBooks, New York, 1995). 
40  I note David Caygill's paper to this conference (David Caygill "1990s: Decade of Change" (2003) 34 
VUWLR, 395) that argues that the ACC's improved performance is not due to competition (or monopoly).  
Hopefully, it would have indeed improved its performance in the absence of competition.  However, this 
barely touches on the issues of information and incentives, choice and variety that underlie the case for 
competition.  The ACC cannot offer value for money because consumers cannot signal what they really 
value. 
 A CASE  STUDY IN PUBLIC POLICY FAILURE 327 
the Workers’ Compensation for Accidents Act 1900.  After 1900, employers were liable for all 
work accidents except those caused by serious misconduct by the employee.  This Act was rapidly 
replaced by the Workers’ Compensation Act 1908.  The 1908 Act substantially increased the 
maximum compensation payable and, though frequently amended, formed the basis of workers’ 
compensation for the next 65 years.  Under this Act employers were liable for all accidents, with a 
prescribed schedule for maximum payments and a proportional scale of compensation for 
incapacity.  In 1947 it became compulsory for employers to insure against accident liability.  At the 
same time a Workers’ Compensation Board was set up to cover workers whose employers had 
failed to insure, recover those payments from the employer and set the maximum rates that state or 
private insurers could charge.  Common law remedies for personal injury or property damage were 
also available for work and non-work accidents.  Workers could take common law actions against 
negligent employers in order to augment their compensation, although damages awarded were 
likely to take into account the amounts already received.41 
Notwithstanding the growth in collectivism during this period, an enduring theme is the 
humanitarian concern with the plight of law-abiding workers and their families when they suffer 
serious injury and are inadequately insured. 
Even so, humanitarians must be concerned with the human plight rather than its cause – 
accident or sickness.  In the absence of a monopoly accident insurer we would expect to see a much 
deeper market for income-replacement insurance and health insurance that covered both accidents 
and sickness.  Then there would be the issue of the interface between this system and the welfare 
state and its relationship to private, voluntary, humanitarian activities and organisations in 
general.42 
The focus on workers' compensation is much too narrow from a humanitarian perspective and 
the attack the ACC represents on common law rights smacks of an elitist disregard for 
constitutionalism.  Until someone can produce a principled public policy defence for monopoly and 
the removal of common law rights, the ACC's tenure looks fragile. 
  
41  The historical information here is based on section 1 in New Zealand Employers Federation A New 
Prescription for Accident Compensation (New Zealand Employers Federation, Wellington, 1995) 1-69.  See 
also Statistics New Zealand Official Yearbook 2000 (Government Printing Office, Wellington, 2000) 197. 
42  For a discussion of the issue of the uninsured, see Richard Epstein Accident Compensation: The Faulty 
Basis of No-Fault and State Provision (New Zealand Business Roundtable, 1996) 33-35. 
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